We assess the effect of privatization on performance in a panel of Nigerian banks for the period 1990-2001. We find evidence of performance improvement in nine banks that were privatized, which is remarkable given the inhospitable environment for true financial intermediation. Our results also suggest negative effects of the continuing minority government ownership on the performance of many Nigerian banks. Finally, our results complement aggregate indications of decreasing financial intermediation over the 1990s; banks that focused on investment in government bonds and non-lending activities enjoyed a relatively higher performance.
Introduction
Cross-country and bank-level evidence has shown the poor performance of government-owned banks, especially in developing countries (La Porta et al, 2001 , Dinc, 2003 , so that privatization could be expected to improve performance and thus boost efficiency of financial intermediation. Evidence from individual countries that have undertaken large privatization programs, however, has been mixed (Cull, Clarke, and Shirley, 2003; Megginson, 2003) . For example, in Mexico in the early and mid-1990s, privatization outcomes were bad enough to prompt re-nationalization of the banking sector in the wake of the Tequila crisis (Haber and Kantor, 2003) . Banking sector performance eventually improved, but only after a second round of privatization in the late 1990s in which foreign ownership participation was encouraged. Initial attempts at bank privatization in the Czech Republic, and to a lesser extent Poland, were also not fully successful, at least in part because the state maintained relatively large shareholdings in the privatized banks and discouraged ownership by foreign investors (Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel 2003) . Assessing the effects of privatization across countries is made difficult by country-specific circumstances that are hard to control for. 1 Researchers have therefore turned to country-level studies, which offer natural experiments if data availability allows the performance assessment of privatized banks before and after privatization, relative to other banks in the financial system and controlling for other bank and country-level but time-variant characteristics.
This paper assesses the effect of privatization on bank performance in Nigeria over the period 1990-2001. Nigeria undertook a major privatization program in the early 1990s, divesting a total of 14 banks, constituting more than 50% of total banking system assets.
However, this period was also characterized by other major changes in the financial system.
The privatizations were part of a larger liberalization process that included interest rate and entry liberalization and the loosening of credit allocation quotas. At the same time, a multitiered exchange rate market offered plenty of arbitrage and rent opportunities for licensed banks. Consequently, the late 1980s saw a massive entry of new banks specializing in foreign exchange operations. While the number of banks multiplied during this period and the financial sector boomed, financial intermediation, as measured by credit to the private sector and deposits decreased. Finally, economic recession and political instability brought the boom to a halt in 1992, with a major banking crisis crippling the financial system until the late 1990s.
The volatile macroeconomic and financial environment, in which the privatization took place, makes it difficult to compare the effects of the Nigerian privatization program to privatization in other countries. We therefore evaluate the effects of privatization on bank performance relative to the same banks before privatization and to other privately owned banks in Nigeria. Specifically, we assess the performance of privatized banks, i.e. the return on assets and equity as well as the share of non-performing loans (NPL) relative to other banks in the Nigerian financial system and relative to their performance before privatization.
Given the large reliance of banks on foreign exchange revenue during the sample period, we use profit measures both including and excluding foreign exchange profits. We apply different robustness tests and estimations techniques.
Our results indicate some performance improvement due to privatization. While privatized banks performed significantly worse than privately owned commercial banks before privatization, this gap was effectively closed by privatization. This is remarkable given the macroeconomic and regulatory environment that was very inhospitable to true financial intermediation during our sample period. However, there were no further performance gains after privatization and beyond the performance of other banks in the Nigerian banking system, and improvements were only for profitability ratios. We find no significant post-privatization cost reductions or improvement in either cost or profit efficiency. Further, our results give evidence of the poor performance of banks that continued with minority government ownership during the sample period.
Our results also provide microeconomic evidence on the distorted incentives that banks faced in Nigeria during the sample period. Long established banks that focused on retail banking performed significantly more poorly than new wholesale banks that focused on lending to the government and on fee-based business. These results are the microeconomic complement to the aggregate picture of declining financial intermediation that Nigeria suffered during this period.
Our results are subject to some caveats. First, poor data quality makes it difficult to find significant relationships between bank characteristics such as ownership and bank performance. Given that we find significant and robust relationships in spite of these shortcomings makes us more confident in our findings. Second, limited information on the privatization transactions and the individual banks limit our analysis to a primarily statistical one. We try to offset these hurdles with a thorough sensitivity analysis.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it shows the effects of privatization on performance in the context of a financial system that went through a boom and bust cycle with perverse incentives for true financial intermediation. Second, it analyses country analysis is more difficult. (Clarke, Cull, and Shirley, 2003) .
Fourth, we study share issue privatizations (SIPs) in which the government fully divested its shareholdings. In other developing countries where governments attempted SIPs of banks, they also tended retain sizable shareholdings, and post-privatization performance improvements did not materialize (Clarke, Cull, and Shirley, 2003) . In those cases, it is difficult to identify whether poor outcomes should be attributed the government's failure to fully relinquish its shareholding, or to attempting a SIP where stock markets, and the associated monitoring of firms by investors, were not fully developed. To the extent that our empirical tests reveal that the SIPs in Nigeria were unsuccessful, the SIP method itself is called into question.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers background information on the financial system in Nigeria. Section 3 describes our data and the methodology. Section 4 presents our main results and section 5 provides robustness tests.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Sobodu and Akiode (1998) assess the performance of Nigerian commercial banks over the period 1983-1993 using data envelopment analysis. They find an initial improvement in performance right after the beginning of financial liberalization in 1986 and a steady decline thereafter. Their sample period, however, does not allow them to test the effect of privatization. In the 1970s, the Nigerian authorities introduced an array of direct controls in the banking system, both through ownership, as well as through interest rate and credit controls.
2.

Banking in Nigeria: From Boom to Bust
As part of an "indigenization wave" that had the goal of securing domestic majority ownership of strategically important sectors, many foreign-owned banks were nationalized, since no Nigerian purchaser could be found. 4 While these shares were formally warehoused for future sale, they effectively were used for political influence in these banks. At the same time, entry into the banking system was restricted, a floor for deposit and a ceiling for lending interest rates were established and a credit allocation quota of up to 70% of a bank's portfolio was enforced.
In the context of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986, Nigeria undertook a broad program of financial liberalization. Interest rates and entry into the banking system were liberalized, and credit allocation quotas loosened. At the same time, while ending direct rationing of foreign exchange for the real sector, the government maintained a multiple exchange rate regime, thus opening a new area of arbitrage and rent seeking for financial institutions that had privileged access to foreign exchange auctions. 5 The consequence was the quick entry of many new players into the banking system, especially merchant banks that specialized in foreign exchange operations. 6 Very low entry requirements and the high market premiums that could be earned with arbitrage activities in the foreign exchange markets allowed for returns on equity of 300% or more (Lewis and Stein, 2002) . In the following years, the number of banks tripled from 41 to over 120 (Table 1) , employment in the financial sector doubled and the contribution of the financial system to GDP almost tripled (Lewis and Stein, 2002) .
The financial sector boom, however, was accompanied by financial disintermediation. Deposits in financial institutions and credit to the private sector, both relative to GDP, decreased over the period 1986 to 1992 (Table 1 ). The increasing number of banks and human capital in the financial sector was thus channeled into arbitrage and rent-seeking activity rather than financial intermediation.
By 1990, the bubble started to burst. Non-performing loans (NPLs) increased sharply.
Especially, the merchant bank sector -where most of the foreign exchange speculators were concentrated -and the government-owned banks showed increasing signs of distress. In 1991, the Central Bank imposed a moratorium on new licenses. New Prudential Guidelines, introduced in 1990-91 made the extent of distress in the banking system even clearer. During 1992, several banks were scrutinized and delicensed. By mid 1993, political uncertainty 4 In 1993, the Federal Government acquired a 40 per cent equity ownership of the three largest banks. In 1996, under the second Nigerian enterprise decree requiring 60 per cent indigenous holding, the Government acquired an additional 20 per cent holding in the three banks and 60 per cent in the other foreign-owned banks. 5 The arbitrage potential arose from the spread between the official exchange rate and the interbank rate. After the trade liberalization, which was part of the SAP, there was an increasing demand for trade-related financing. Lewis and Stein (2002) describe the different arbitrage possibilities in more detail.
following a failed transition to civilian rule triggered a bank run, which resulted in paralysis of the financial system, temporary closures and bank failures. Finally, in 1994, the new military government reintroduced exchange and interest rate controls. The following inflationary burst, rising black market premium on the Naira and economic decline resulted in windfall gains for some connected market participants, while deepening the overall distress in the financial system.
Political economy explanations of the liberalization and boom-and-bust period focus on rent-seeking activities of the governing elites (Lewis and Stein, 2002 (Lewis and Stein, 2002) . In 1995, at the high point of the banking crisis, the government even considered renationalizing the banks, but was discouraged by internal and external pressure.
As the financial boom was fed by arbitrage and rent-seeking activities, so did the government use the resolution of the banking crisis for political purposes. A Failed Bank
Decree was used to prosecute cases of misconduct and fraud in the banking industry, but most detainees were concentrated in specific ethnic groups and groups opposed to the regime. Few failing banks, on the other hand, were resolved and the authorities focused more on containing than resolving the crisis. It was only under the new government in 1998, which eventually handed over power to a civilian regime in May 1999, that a more serious cleanup started in the financial system, with 26 bank licenses revoked in 1998.
3.
Data and Methodology
We have an unbalanced sample of 69 banks with annual data for the period 1990
through 2001, with a total of 576 observations. Since not all variables are available for all banks, fewer observations are included in some of the regressions. In our empirical analysis, we focus on the performance of nine banks that were completely privatized during the sample period, i.e. where the government completely divested its shareholding. 8 Our sample also contains 24 commercial banks and 17 merchant banks that were privately owned, as well as eight privately owned banks that changed form (from merchant to commercial) during the sample period. 9 We have data on two banks that were completely state-owned during the sample period and nine banks with minority-ownership stakes of the government.
In the bulk of our empirical analysis we focus on three performance measures. Return on Equity (ROE) is defined as profits relative to equity, while Return on Assets (ROA) is profits relative to total assets. Since a large share of banks' profits came from foreign exchange operations, in some specifications we use measures of ROA and ROE that exclude The regulatory difference between commercial and merchant banks has been eliminated recently. Commercial banks were subject to higher thresholds on initial capital, and more restrictions on branching and lending. Merchant banks could not take demand deposits and focused mostly on corporate and institutional clients. Until 1996, merchant banks were required to channel 20% of their loan portfolio into medium-and long-term lending.
costs to assets, cost efficiency, and profit efficiency. The efficiency measures are derived from alternative cost and profit functions that control for the outputs produced by each bank. Figure 1 shows the performance of different bank groups over the whole sample period. While Commercial Private banks had higher ROE than any other bank group, they were at par with the merchant banks, both privately and government-owned in their ROA and NPL ratio. The Eventually Privatized and Commercial State banks had lower ROA and higher NPL ratios than merchant banks and Commercial Private banks, but similar ROE as other banks, except for the Commercial Private banks. Figure 1 shows an improvement in performance after privatization. We present the average for each indicator in the three years before and eight years after privatization. 10 ROA and ROE, both including and excluding foreign exchange profits show an improvement in the first year after privatization before they decrease again, while the NPL ratio increased with privatization before decreasing for several years. While this indicates a positive performance effect of privatization, it does not control for (i) changes in performance in other Nigerian banks, and (ii) for other bank characteristics and policies that might have changed after privatization. Especially, the increase in ROA and ROE after t+4 might be explained by macroeconomic improvement that affected all banks.
To assess the effect of privatization on bank performance, while controlling for other bank characteristics, we use the following regression: Performance is one of five variables measuring the performance of bank i at time t. As noted, those variables include return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), and the share of total loans that are non-performing. We use ROE and ROA both including and excluding foreign exchange revenues.
We use three explanatory variables to de-compose the causes and effects of privatization. The first is Eventually Privatized, a dummy variable that equals one throughout the whole sample for banks that were privatized at some point. We include this variable to capture any selection effects associated with bank privatization. To the extent that weak banks were privatized, we expect it to have a negative coefficient. The second is Privatized, a dummy variable that equals one from the moment bank i is privatized. We define privatization as the point where the government relinquished its entire shareholding in the bank, be it in the form of minority or majority ownership. One of the nine banks was privatized in 1992, with the remaining eight privatized in 1993. The third variable is Time since Privatization, which measures the years since bank i was privatized. While Privatized is included to capture the immediate effects of privatization, including any cleaning of the loan portfolio at or just prior to the time of sale, Time since Privatization captures the average yearly performance trend in the wake of that sale. To statistically assess the effect of privatization after year n, we evaluate Privatized + n*Time since Privatization.
We assess the effect of ownership patterns beyond privatization of the nine banks.
Specifically, we control for state participation in banking using three different variables. The first is State Control, a dummy variable equal to one throughout the period for banks that were wholly owned by the government, and thus did not experience any changes in ownership structure. However, the links between the state and the banking sector in Nigeria are complex, with the government retaining ownership participation in many banks under private control. We therefore control for minority state participation using Merchant Bank State, if the bank is a merchant bank, and Commercial Bank State, if the bank is a commercial bank.
Both are dummy variables equal to one if the state had any minority ownership participation in the bank in question. 11 We use two separate variables because, as described above, the activities of merchant and commercial banks differ, which could have implications for performance, and for the impact of state ownership on performance. Finally, Merchant Bank
Private is a dummy variable for wholly privately owned merchant banks, while privately owned commercial banks are captured by the constant.
We also include a number of variables to control for the size and age of the bank and its business orientation. Assets is the log of real assets measured at time t-1. Larger banks might have enjoyed scale or scope economies that had positive effects on their performance.
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We also control for the age of the bank (Age) since longer established banks might have enjoyed performance advantages over relative newcomers. On the other hand, in a developing country like Nigeria older banks might have been relatively entrenched in their business methods, and thus relatively incapable of pursuing new profit opportunities. Since many new banks were established with the purpose of gaining rents on the foreign exchange rate market, this would result in a negative relation of Age with Performance. 11 We also experimented with replacing the minority state participation dummy variable with the government's actual ownership share. However, the results did not indicate the performance was worse (or better) as the size of the minority ownership stake increased. This could be because the minority state ownership stakes for many banks fluctuated during this period. 12 This was true, for example, for measures of cost and profit efficiency in Argentina in the 1990s (Berger et al., 2003) .
In robustness tests, we include further measures of the business and loan portfolio orientation and productivity of the bank. We include two variables to capture the business orientation of the bank. Branches, is the log of the number of branches. Banks with more branches were likely to have a retail orientation, which also might have had an impact on performance, although it is difficult to predict whether any such effect would have been positive or negative. Fee income is the share of non-interest (and non foreign-exchange) revenue in total revenue.
We include two variables to control for loan portfolio orientation, the ratio of government bonds to total assets and the share of net loans to total assets. We include two indicators of the productivity of the bank; fixed assets relative to total assets and the ratio of overhead costs to total assets. Finally, we include year dummies to control for macroeconomic and business cycle factors that affected all banks. percentile, however, eliminates most of the outliers. The NPL ratio ranges from zero to 92%.
There is wide variation in both size and age across banks, as well as business and portfolio orientation and productivity.
All five performance indicators are significantly correlated with each other.
Interestingly, few of our ownership dummy variables are significantly correlated with performance. Neither the age nor the size of the bank is correlated with performance, while banks with a larger share of government bonds, less fixed assets and lower operating costs have higher ROA and ROE. The banks that were eventually privatized are larger, and older, have more branches, have higher operating costs and have a lower share of fee-based income.
One of the estimation problems we faced was poor data quality, which stems from the poor quality of accounting standards common among developing countries. 14 In the case of Nigeria, these problems are exacerbated by the high and volatile inflation the country suffered during our sample period. 
4.
Main Results
The results in Table 3 provide evidence of a significant and robust performance improvement after privatization. We present models where we restrict the sample to values of the dependent variable between the 1 st and 99 th percentile of its distribution in columns one through five, and models where we use all observations but robust regressions to control for the impact of outliers, in columns six through ten.
There is strong evidence that relatively weak banks were chosen for privatization.
Eventually Privatized enters significantly and with the expected sign in all ten regressions.
The banks that were eventually privatized had a lower return on assets and on equity, both including and excluding foreign exchange profits, and had higher NPL. This suggests that the government relinquished control of relatively weak banks. Significance difference tests between Eventually Privatized, on the one hand, and Merchant-State and Commercial-State, on the other hand, also indicate that the eventually privatized banks were weaker than the banks where the government kept their minority stake; the only differences that are not significant are between Merchant State and Eventually Privatized in the ROA regressions.
Privatization resulted in a significant increase in ROE and a significant decrease in NPL.
Privatized enters significantly and positively in all ROE regressions and significantly and negatively in both NPL regressions. The coefficients on Privatized and Eventually Privatized are of similar size, but of opposite sign in all regressions where both enter significantly, which indicates that the performance gap between commercial privately owned banks and privatized banks was closed through privatization. However, this also indicates that performance improvements are bounded by the quality of other banks in the system. 16 Further, there was no performance improvement in the years after privatization, as indicated by the insignificant coefficients on Time since Privatization. Of course, that insignificance also implies that the privatized banks did not return to their laggard pre-privatization performance, but rather remained on par with other private banks.
The regression results in Table 3 also indicate that commercial banks that had a minority government ownership throughout the period and were not privatized performed significantly worse than commercial privately owned banks; Commercial-State enters significant at the 10% level in all robust regressions, and significant at the 5% level or better in the ROA and NPL truncated regressions. This suggests that minority ownership hampered the performance of these banks significantly.
There is no robust evidence on the performance of merchant banks relative to privately owned commercial banks. While privately owned merchant banks have significantly lower NPL than commercial banks, the evidence on ROA and ROE is not robust across different estimation techniques and to the exclusion of foreign exchange profits. Similarly, merchant banks with minority government ownership enjoyed lower NPL than privately owned commercial banks, but the evidence on ROA and ROE is not consistent and robust. There is no significant difference between merchant banks that are completely privately owned and those with minority government ownership. Finally, the results indicate that older banks and smaller banks perform worse. This seems to indicate that larger banks did enjoy economies of scale and scope and that new entrants into the market were better able to pursue new profit opportunities. Given that age enters significantly even in the performance regressions where we exclude foreign exchange profits, this effect cannot be attributed completely to foreign exchange speculation.
16 Similar results were found for the case of privatized state banks in Argentina (Berger et al., 2003) .
The regressions in Table 4 confirm our previous finding of a positive link between privatization and performance, and give some additional insights into bank characteristics that explain variation in bank profitability. Here we include additional indicators of business and portfolio orientation and productivity. Columns one through five present results of the sample limited to the 1 st through 99 th percentile, while columns six through ten report the results of robust regressions.
While weak banks were chosen for privatization, privatization did close the performance gap to privately owned commercial banks. Eventually Privatized enters significantly in all ten regressions, while Privatized enters significantly in all but two regressions. As before, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of both coefficients is not significantly different from zero, and again there was no further performance improvement after the first year of privatization. Also as before, larger and younger banks perform better.
However, in Table 4 we cannot find any robust link between the other ownership dummies and performance.
The results in Table 4 also indicate that retail-oriented banks with a larger branch network have a lower ROA, while there is evidence that banks focusing on fee-based business have a higher ROE and ROA, but also a higher NPL ratio. Banks with a larger share of government bonds in their portfolio performed better, enjoying higher ROA and ROE, while there is no significant and robust relationship between the importance of interbank loans and performance. Finally, banks with higher operating costs relative to assets perform worse, while there is no robust relationship between the share of fixed assets and performance.
By comparing Tables 3 and 4 , one can see that the inclusion of the operating costs variable does not greatly alter the privatization coefficients. This suggests that the post-privatization improvements in profitability and portfolio quality were not attributable to cost savings. Indeed, in regressions where we use the same explanatory variables as in Tables 3   and 4 , but replace the dependent variable with the ratio of operating costs to assets, the privatization variable is never significant (results not reported).
Robustness Checks
In a sample with potential measurement error and multiple observations from the same bank, error terms might not truly be independent of one another. In particular, the errors for individual banks might be correlated. Moreover, to the extent that measurement error is likely to be systematically higher for particular banks, their observations could be driving our results. We offer two solutions. The first relaxes the assumption of independent errors, allowing for correlation between observations from the same bank, using so-called clustered standard errors. 17 The second uses bank-specific fixed effects, which directly control for heterogeneity between different banks.
Controlling for clustered standard error terms does not change the conclusions of our paper (Table 5 , columns 1-5). Eventually Privatized still enters significantly, negatively in the ROE and positively in the NPL regressions (10% level in the ROA regressions), while
Privatized enters positively and significantly at the 5% level in the ROE and negatively and significantly at the 10% level in the NPL regressions. Controlling for clustered standard errors, we still find that banks with higher fee-based income have higher ROA and ROE, but also higher NPL, and banks with a higher share of government bonds and lower operating costs have higher ROE and ROA and lower NPL.
Controlling for bank-specific fixed effects does not affect our findings (Table 5, columns 6-10). Introducing fixed effects changes the interpretation of our coefficients as implying changes from the bank-specific mean, so that all variables that are constant over the entire period for individual banks are dropped from the regressions. Specifically, we do not have to control anymore for selection bias by introducing the variable Eventually Privatized.
Privatized enters significantly and positively in the regressions of ROE, ROE No Forex, and ROA No Forex, and significantly and negatively in the NPL regression, indicating a clear performance improvement after privatization. Banks that relied more on fee-based income and had a higher share of government bonds had higher ROA and ROE, but also a higher NPL ratio. Banks with lower operating costs had higher ROE and ROA and a lower NPL ratio.
As a final empirical exercise, we derive efficiency measures to predict how well each bank would perform if it produced the same set of outputs. We develop one measure for cost efficiency and another for profit efficiency. We follow the method of Berger et al. (2003) , who perform a similar exercise for Argentina, although their data on bank outputs is more comprehensive than ours.
The profit efficiency measure is based on residuals from a profit function estimated for each year for which sufficient data are available. Profits are specified as a translog function of the quantities of three asset output categories: financial sector loans, non-financial sector loans, and securities. The profits and outputs are all normalized by equity capital, which reduces heteroskedasticity and makes residuals more comparable across banks. 18 Berger et al. (2003) note that normalizing in this way makes the profit function more economically meaningful as it relates ROE to the allocation of assets to different categories. The residuals from the yearly profit functions are put in reverse order and, based on that ordering, we derive a yearly percentile ranking for each bank. 19 It is those percentile rankings that are used as the dependent variable in the regressions that appear in Table 6 .
The bank privatization coefficient is positive, but insignificant in the four profit efficiency regressions in Table 6 . Those models use clustered standard errors, but results are similar when we use robust regression (not reported). The lack of significance calls into question some of our results from Tables 3-5. Although Tables 4 and 5 also control for many of the asset categories that enter the profit function, this more precise test fails to produce the same results. This could be because our data on outputs are not comprehensive or reliable enough to undertake this exercise, although the poor performance of the state-owned banks and the minority-state-owned commercial banks is still present in the profit efficiency regressions.
We perform a similar exercise to measure cost efficiency via a translog cost function, except that we normalize the dependent variable, operating costs, and the bank output measures by assets instead of equity. We order residuals from highest to lowest, because high costs imply a low ranking, and derive a percentile ranking that serves as the dependent variable in models 5-6 of Table 6 . The privatization coefficient is insignificant, as it was in simple specifications that used the ratio of operating costs to assets as the dependent variable. This is further confirmation that post-privatization profitability improvements were not attributable to cost reductions.
18 See Berger and Mester (1997) and Berger et al. (2003) for more discussion of the advantages of quantity-based efficiency measures, especially when data on input and output prices is unreliable. In our case, price data is unavailable. We obtain similar results when we normalize by assets instead of equity. 19 We also add a constant to ROE before logging to avoid taking the log of a negative number.
6.
Conclusions
Using a unique database on Nigerian banks, this paper has shown some positive performance effects of privatization, even in an economy with weak institutions and a macroeconomic and regulatory environment that was inhospitable to financial intermediation.
While government owned banks performed significantly worse in terms of return on equity and loan portfolio quality than privately owned banks, privatization helped close this gap, while other government-owned banks, even with only a minority ownership stake of the government, continued with the significantly poorer performance. Our findings, however, also show the boundaries of privatization. We do not find any performance improvement beyond other banks in the Nigerian banking system. The underlying perverse incentive structure that was given by adverse macroeconomic conditions and regulatory arbitrariness resulted in high returns on investment in government bonds and non-lending activities, while punishing banks focusing on retail lending.
In the end, the Nigeria case is difficult to classify as a success or failure. On the one hand, it offers evidence of limited performance improvement after a share issue privatization in a relatively weak institutional environment. At least a part of that performance improvement is likely attributable the government fully relinquishing its shareholding in these banks. In SIPs in other developing countries, the government has tended to retain substantial shares in the 'privatized' bank, and performance did not improve. On the other hand, the performance improvements relate only to profitability and portfolio quality. Since other tests indicate that privatization did not bring about costs reductions, profitability improvement is only attributable to increased revenue generation. Moreover, since the mix of profit generating activities for Nigerian banks was tilted away from private lending, it is doubtful that increased profitability coincided with substantial welfare improvement. 
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